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Abstract
The paper analyzes the case law of the US Supreme Court on terrorism with the purpose of 
answering the question whether the Supreme Court has taken fundamental rights (and especially 
habeas corpus) seriously while reviewing the legality of the measures adopted by the political 
branches of government to counter the terrorist threat. To provide an adequate answer, the paper 
distinguishes between three different jurisprudential phases, providing an example for each of them. 
In each step, in fact, the Supreme Court has adopted a peculiar stand toward the other branches of 
government and therefore ensured a different degree of fundamental rights protection. In a first, 
initial phase, the Supreme Court has been very deferential vis à vis the executive and legislative 
powers and has restricted to a minimum the protection of fundamental rights. In a second, 
intermediate phase, then, the Court has gradually modified its stand toward the executive power and 
has began raising the level of procedural rights’ protection. In the last phase, finally, the Court has 
reasserted its institutional role and taken fundamental rights seriously, upholding the primary value 
of the habeas corpus provision enshrined in the Constitution. 
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SUMMARY: 1. Introduction.- 2. “Detention of individuals for the duration of the particular conflict is fundamental and 
accepted an incident to war” :  the initial  self-restraint  towards the executive and legislative powers.- 3.  “Ordinary 
principles of statutory construction suffice to rebut the Government’s theory” : first steps in the restoration of the rule of 
law.- 4. “The laws and the Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times” : taking 
rights seriously.- 5. “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition” : separation and balance of powers in the US 
Constitution.- 6. Conclusion.
1. Introduction
Interesting times for  habeas corpus in the US. On October 7, 2008 a federal judge of the 
district  court  of  Washington  DC,  Ricardo  M.  Urbina,  has  ordered  the  Bush Administration  to 
release 17 Chinese citizens of the Uighur Muslim minority from the military prison of Guantanamo 
Bay, in Cuba1. On November 19, 2008 then another federal judge of the same district, Richard J. 
Leon,  has  ruled  that  five  Algerian  nationals  have  been  unlawfully  detained  in  Guantanamo  as 
enemy combatants for nearly seven years,  since the beginning of the war against  the Al Qaeda 
terrorist organization, and required the executive to release them immediately2. Both decisions have 
been taken in habeas corpus proceeding authorized by a landmark Supreme Court ruling on June 
12, 2008, Boumediene v. Bush3, that gave prisoners detained in Guantanamo as enemy combatants 
the constitutional right to have federal judges review the reason for their detention. 
 Federico Fabbrini is a PhD student at the Law Department, European University Institute. He holds an undergraduate 
degree summa cum laude in European and Transnational Law at the University of Trento School of Law (Italy) and a 
JD summa cum laude in International Law at the University of Bologna School of Law (Italy). He was a fellow of the 
Collegio Superiore Alma Mater Studiorum Bologna (Italy), an aggregated fellow at the Ecole Normale Supérieure Paris 
(France) in 2007 and a visiting student at the University of California Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law (USA) in 
2005. E-mail: federico.fabbrini@eui.eu
1 William Glaberson, Judge Order 17 Detainees at Guantanamo Freed, The New York Times, October 7, 2008
2 William Glaberson, Judge Declares Five Detainees Held Illegally, The New York Times, November 20, 2008; See 
also William Glaberson, Judge Opens First Habeas Corpus Hearing on Guantanamo Detainees, The New York Times, 
November 6, 2008. For an recent analysis of these late 2008 decisions, see then William Glaberson, Rulings of  
Improper Detention as the Bush Era Closes, The New York Times, January 18, 2009
3 U.S. 128 S.Ct. 2229 
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This paper deals with the case law of the US Supreme Court on terrorism4. My purpose is to 
answer  the  question  whether  the  Supreme  Court  has  taken  fundamental  rights  seriously  into 
account,  while  reviewing  the  legality  of  the  measures  adopted  by  the  political  branches  of 
government  to  counter  the  terrorist  threat.  For  this  reason,  I  will  trace  the  evolution  of  the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, from the first decisions on the matter to the most recent one, 
highlighting  the transformations  in the protection of fundamental  rights.  In particular,  the main 
issue of the US Supreme Court’s case law on terrorism concerns the privilege of habeas corpus: i.e. 
the right of the enemy combatants, captured in the course of the hostilities with Al Qaeda (mainly in 
Afghanistan) and imprisoned by the US military forces (mainly in Guantanamo), to challenge the 
legality of their detention in front of an independent and regularly constituted tribunal.
The habeas corpus is a common law privilege, dating back to the Magna Charta of 12155. In 
the English legal  system based on a limited  number  of forms of action6,  habeas corpus was a 
prerogative  writ:  i.e.  the  “order  by  which  the  King  addressed  his  local  servant,  the  sheriff, 
commanding him to assure the satisfaction  of the right  of the subject who obtained the writ”7. 
Specifically,  it  was the order that  common law courts addressed to the organs of the executive 
power “to obtain the exhibition of a prisoner to review the legality of detention”8. In the years, 
habeas corpus came to be considered as the “bulwark of the British Constitution”, since it was the 
most  effective  instrument  in  safeguarding  liberty  against  the  “dangerous  engine  of  arbitrary 
government”9. The privilege was later inherited by the US and engraved in the 1787 Constitution, 
4 On the US Supreme Court and terrorism see: DAVID COLE & JAMES DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2002); DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERROR (2003); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L. J., 
2004, 1029-1091 now BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM  
(2006); Tommaso Edoardo Frosini & Carla Bassu, La libertà personale nell’emergenza costituzionale, in DEMOCRAZIE 
PROTETTE E PROTEZIONE DELLA DEMOCRAZIA (Alfonso Di Giovine ed., 2004) 75-102; Fulco Lanchester, La Corte Suprema e 
l’emergenza, in ASSOCIAZIONE DEI COSTITUZIONALISTI WP (2004) available at: www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it; 
Ronald Dworkin, Corte Suprema e garanzie nel trattamento dei terroristi, 4 QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI (2005), 905-920; 
Michel Rosenfeld, Judicial Balancing in Time of Stress: Comparing the American, British and Israeli Approaches to  
the War on Terror, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. (2006), 2079-2150; CURTIS BRADLEY & JACK GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATION LAW  
(2006); PAOLO BONETTI, TERRORISMO, EMERGENZA E COSTITUZIONI DEMOCRATICHE (2006); Carla Bassu, Il ruolo delle corti nella  
lotta al terrorismo: una comparazione angloamericana, 3 QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI (2006), 467-489; Chiara Bologna, 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: quando la tutela dei diritti è effetto della separazione dei poteri, 4 QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 
(2006), 813-817; Chiara Bologna, Tutela dei diritti ed emergenza nell’esperienza statunitense: una political question?, 
in FORUM DI QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI WP (2007) available at: www.forumcostituzionale.it; Giacomo Delledonne, 
Separazione dei poteri e stato di crisi nell’ordinamento degli Stati Uniti: le lezioni di Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in SCUOLA 
SUPERIORE SANT’ANNA WP (2007). For an International law perspective on the issue, see PHILIP SAND, LAWLESS WORLD: 
AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)
5 AUGUSTO BARBERA, LE BASI FILOSOFICHE DEL COSTITUZIONALISMO  (1996)
6 FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW  (1948)
7 UGO MATTEI, IL MODELLO DI COMMON LAW 7 (1996)
8 Id., 14
9 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1765-1769)  quoted in, FEDERALIST PAPERS, LXXXIV 
(Hamilton), (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987), 475
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Art.I, §9, cl.2 (the Suspension Clause) stating that “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it”10.
My argument is that it is possible to identify in the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court a 
three steps evolution11. In each step the Supreme Court has adopted a particular stand toward the 
other  branches  of  government  and  therefore  ensured  a  different  degree  of  fundamental  rights 
protection. In a first, initial phase, exemplified by the 2004 decisions in  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld12 and 
Rasul v.Bush13, the Supreme Court has been very deferential vis à vis the executive and legislative 
powers  and  has  restricted  to  a  minimum  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights.  In  a  second, 
intermediate phase, especially in the 2006 Hamdan v. Bush14 ruling, the Court has then abandoned 
its self restraint with regard to the executive power and enhanced rights protection. Eventually, in a 
third, final phase, exemplified by the judgment of Boumediene v. Bush, the Court has reasserted its 
constitutional role and has wholly fulfilled his duty of protecting fundamental right.
As far as the structure of the paper is concerned, therefore, in chapters 2, 3 and 4 I will deal 
separately with each of the three judicial phases I have just delineated. In chapter 5, finally, I will 
employ the evidences gathered in the analysis of the Supreme Court’s case law on the protection of 
fundamental rights in the fight against terrorism to draw some conclusion about the role that the 
judiciary plays in the US constitutional system, founded on the Madisonian theory of the separation 
and balance of powers. Indeed, the Supreme Court does not operate in a vacuum and is influenced 
by  the  pressure  that  the  other  branches  of  government  exercise,  especially  during  times  of 
emergency, to have more room for manoeuvre15. In the long run, however, the Supreme Court turns 
out to be the crucial institution16 since it belongs to her, and not the President or the Congress, to say 
“what the law is”17.
10 US Const., Art. I. § 9, cl. 2. On habeas corpus in the US see: Gerald Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention 
and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1998, 961-1067; Richard Fallon & Daniel. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus 
Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights and the War Power, 120 HARVARD L. REV. 2007, 2029-2112. On fundamental rights 
more generally see LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS  (1958); JAMES STONER, COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, 
HOBBES AND THE ORIGIN OF AMERICAN CONSTIUTIONALISM (1992); THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE (Geoffry Stone, 
Richard Epstein & Cass Sunstein eds., 1992); HOWARD GILMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF  
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993); JOHN ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (2003)
11 In this paper references to the decisions of the US Supreme Court will be made to the slip opinions available in the 
web site of the Supreme Court at: www.ussupremecourt.gov 
12 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
13 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
14 548 U.S. 557 (2006)
15 GORDON SILVERSTEIN, IMBALANCE OF POWERS: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY  
(1997)
16 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1986)
17 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 at 177 (1803). On the most famous Supreme Court decision and on its significance 
in the US constitutional system see: MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT  (1964); MAURO CAPPELLETTI, 
IL CONTROLLO GIUDIZIARIO DELLE LEGGI NEL DIRITTO COMPARATO (1972); John Brigham, The Constitution of the Supreme 
Court, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999)
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2. “Detention of individuals  for the duration of the particular conflict  is fundamental and 
accepted an incident to war”18: the initial self-restraint towards the executive and legislative 
powers
The Supreme Court bumped for the first time into the question of the legality of detention of 
enemy combatants in the cases Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush, argued in April and decided 
on  June  28,  200419.  Both  cases  originated  out  of  habeas  corpus proceeding  brought  by  the 
detainees, held in custody of the US military forces, on the basis of the habeas corpus statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 2241. This congressional bill recognizes a legislative privilege of  habeas corpus stating 
that: “ (a)  Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the 
district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. […] (c) The writ of habeas 
corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless— (3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties of the United States”20.
However, because Hamdi was a US citizen, while Rasul and the other 13 petitioners in his 
trial were foreign nationals, several differences existed between the two proceedings. In the first 
case,  in fact,  other legislative provision specifically tailored for US citizens were applicable:  in 
particular,  the  non-detention  statute,  18  U.S.C.  §  4001,  which  reads:  “(a) No citizen  shall  be 
imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress”21. 
Nonetheless,  the  Supreme Court  adopted  a  minimalist  approach22 in  both decisions,  showing a 
substantial deference towards the determinations of the executive and the legislative powers. By 
avoiding  to  address  the  core  question  of  the  existence  of  a  constitutional  privilege  of  habeas 
corpus23, moreover, the Supreme Court afforded only a limited protection of fundamental rights. 
The deferent position of the Supreme Court  vis à vis the political branches of government 
and its consequence at the substantive level of rights protection, well emerge in Hamdi. In the first 
serious confrontation with a terrorism-related case raising severe constitutional concerns, especially 
with regards to the respect of the principles of due process, the Supreme Court “responded with a 
cacophony of opinions”24 being unable even to agree on a five-Justices majority opinion. Justice 
Sandra D. O’Connor therefore wrote for a plurality of four judges and answered the two main 
questions raised by the plaintiff: 1) does the executive power have the authority to detain as enemy 
18 Hamdi (Opinion of O’Connor J.) at 10
19 A third case, Rumsfeld v. Padilla 542 U.S. 426 (2004) was decided by the US Supreme Court on the same day, but on 
mere procedural grounds
20 28 U.S.C. § 2241
21 18 U.S.C. § 4401
22 CASS SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA  175 (2005)
23 See supra note 10
24 Ackerman (supra note 4) 27
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combatant, without trial, for the indefinite duration of the conflict,  a US citizen captured on the 
battlefield? 2) what process is due to a US citizen who disputes his enemy combatant status?
In answering the first question the Court was clever to avoid addressing the argument of the 
Administration,  which  maintained  that  “no  explicit  congressional  authorization  [was]  required, 
because  the  executive  possesse[d]  plenary  authorization  to  detain  pursuant  to  Art.  II  of  the 
Constitution”25.  According  to  Justice  O’Connor  (supported  here  also  by  the  dissenting  Justice 
Clarence  Thomas),  however,  the  Authorization  for  the  Use  of  Military  Forces  (AUMF)26,  the 
congressional  resolution granting the President  the power “to use all  necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, 
or  aided  the  terrorist  attacks  that  occurred  on  September  11,  2001”  provided  the  “explicit 
congressional authorization for the detention of individuals” required by the non detention statute27.
The majority of the Court thus concluded that the “detention of individuals falling into the 
limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were 
captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary 
and  appropriate  force’  Congress  has  authorized  the  President  to  use”28.  Only  Justices  John  P. 
Stevens and Antonin Scalia, in their fierce dissent, insisted that “where the Government accuses a 
citizen of waging war against it, our constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal 
court for treason or some other crime. Where the exigencies of war prevent that, the Constitution’s 
Suspension Clause, Art. I, §9, cl.  2, allows Congress to relax the usual protections temporarily. 
Absent suspension, however, the Executive’s assertion of military exigency has not been thought 
sufficient to permit detention without charge”29.
To answer the second question,  concerning  the rights  that  citizens  have to  contest  their 
designation by the executive power as enemy combatants, the majority of the Court then balanced 
Hamdi’s “most elemental of liberty interests—the interest in being free from physical detention by 
one’s own government”30 and the “sensitive governmental interests”31 in providing a swift response 
to  the  terrorist  emergency.  By “employing  a  framework  traditionally  reserved for  questions  of 
public  administration”32,  however,  the  Court  resolved  its  “calculus”33,  simply  holding  “that  a 
citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice 
25 Hamdi (Opinion of O’Connor J) at 9
26 Pub. L. 107-40 (2001)
27 See supra note 20
28 Hamdi (Opinion of O’Connor J.) at 10
29 Hamdi (Scalia J. dissenting) at 1
30 Hamdi (Opinion of O’Connor J.) at 22 
31 Id. at 24
32 Ackerman (supra note 4) 30. The framework employed by the Supreme Court had been developed in the case 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
33 Hamdi (Opinion of O’Connor J.) at 25
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of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual 
assertions before a neutral decision-maker”34.
Furthermore, while asserting that “the threats to military operations posed by a basic system 
of  independent  review  are  not  so  weighty  as  to  trump  a  citizen’s  core  rights  to  challenge 
meaningfully  the Government’s  case and to  be heard by an  impartial  adjudicator”35,  the Court 
recognized  that  “enemy  combatant  proceedings  may  be  tailored  to  alleviate  their  uncommon 
potential  to  burden  the  Executive  at  a  time  of  ongoing  military  conflict”36,  e.g.  by  making 
admissible hearsay evidence and shifting the burden of the proof from the executive to the detainee. 
And conclusively, jeopardizing the few guarantees that were just recognized37, the Supreme Court 
made also clear that “there remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be 
met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal”38.
In  conclusion,  “although the popular  press  has haled  Hamdi for reigning in  presidential 
power,  […] a  much  dimmer  view”39 seems necessary.  By adopting  a  “disturbing”40 deferential 
approach vis à vis the war making branches of government and by conceding them much room for 
manoeuvre in the choice of the most appropriate means to tackle the terrorist threat, the Supreme 
Court severely compressed the fundamental procedural protection of  habeas corpus. “When one 
considers where the balance was struck, the departure from [executive] unilateralism was limited. 
From the  standpoint  of  judicial  balancing  itself,  the  plurality  accorded  too  little  weight  to  the 
serious deprivation of liberty associated with the designation as an enemy combatant and too much 
weights on security concerns relating to the war on terrorism”41.
The  US  Supreme  Courts  dealt  with  the  statutory  right  of  habeas  corpus of  enemy 
combatants in  Rasul v. Bush too. Adopting an approach similar to the one shown in  Hamdi, the 
Court  focused parsimoniously42 on a  specific,  “narrow”43 issue,  i.e.  “whether  the  United  States 
courts  lack[ed]  jurisdiction  to  consider  challenges  to  the  legality  of  the  detention  of  foreign 
nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated [in] Guantanamo”44, Cuba. 
Indeed, even if the opinion of the Court (delivered by Justice Stevens, joined by four other judges 
and supported in a concurring opinion by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy)  was favourable to the 
34 Id. at 26
35 Id. at 28-29
36 Id. at 27
37 Dworkin (supra note 4), 910
38 Hamdi (Opinion of O’Connor J.) at 31
39 Ackerman (supra note 4), 29
40 Id., 30
41 Rosenfeld (supra note 4), 2114-2115
42 Michael Reisman, Rasul v. Bush: a Failure to Apply International Law, 2 J. INT. CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2004), 973, 977
43 Rasul (Opinion of the Court) at 1
44 Id.
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petitioner, the ruling was entirely limited to providing an answer to the above mentioned question, 
with no further consideration about the constitutional principle arising out of the case.
In the first part of the decision, Justice Stevens examined the 1903 Treaty between the US 
and Cuba on the legal status of Guantanamo45, acknowledging that whereas the agreement leaves to 
Cuba the ultimate sovereignty over the Bay, it attributes to the US the complete control over it. The 
question for the Court therefore turned out to be whether the habeas corpus statute applied extra-
territorially  in  Cuba:  i.e.  by conferring  “a  right  to  judicial  review of  the  legality  of  executive 
detention of aliens in a territory over which the US exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but 
not  ‘ultimate  sovereignty’” 46.  According  to  the  Court,  moreover,  the  case  at  stake  had  to  be 
distinguished “in important respect”47 from a World War II precedent,  Johnson v. Eisentrager48, 
where the Court denied habeas corpus to enemy aliens captured and held in US custody overseas. 
In the second part of the decision, then, the Supreme Court took notice of the executive 
concession’s  that  the  habeas  corpus statute  was  applicable  to  citizens  held  in  Guantanamo: 
however, since “statute draws no distinction between Americans and aliens held in federal custody, 
[for the majority] there [was] little reason to think that Congress intended the geographical coverage 
of the statute to vary depending on the detainee’s citizenship”49. In the end, therefore, the Court 
concluded that “aliens held at the base, no less than American citizens, are entitled to invoke the 
federal courts’ authority under § 2241”50. Justice Scalia again dissented from the decision: this time, 
however,  criticizing  a  judgment  that  granted  excessive  protection  to  non-US-citizens51, 
“contradicting a half-century-old precedent on which the military undoubtedly relied, Johnson”52.
The Supreme Court decision in Rasul, in conclusion, felt short of a truly adequate response 
to the broad claims of the executive power missing the opportunity “to do much more to right some 
significant wrongs”53. “Because Rasul was disposed on threshold grounds the fate of the detainees 
was not examined in any detail by the US Supreme Court”54, leaving to future judgments the task of 
“binding the actions of the government”55. Even though the Court ruled that enemy aliens detained 
as unlawful combatants in Guantanamo have a right to “challenge the legality of their detention”56, 
it  grounded  this  fundamental  procedural  right  on  a  simple  congressional  statute.  It  therefore 
45 Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations between Cuba and the U.S., February 23, 1903. T.S. No. 418
46 Rasul (Opinion of the Court) at 6
47 Id. at 7
48 339 U.S. 763 (1950)
49 Rasul (Opinion of the Court) at 12
50 Id. at 12-13
51 Cole (supra note 4), 194
52 Rasul (Scalia J. dissenting) at 1
53 George Aldrich, Had the US Executive Gone Too Far?: Comments on Rasul and Hamdi, 2 J. INT. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(2004), 967, 971
54 Rosenfeld (supra note 4), 2144
55 Dworkin (supra note 4), 915
56 Rasul (Opinion of the Court) at 15
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remained open the possibility for Congress, especially if in disagreement with the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Rasul, “to change § 2241”57. Which, off course, soon happened.
3. “Ordinary principles of statutory construction suffice to rebut the Government’s theory”58: 
first steps in the restoration of the rule of law
In December 2005, the US Congress approved the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)59. This 
bill aimed at ensuring a minimum standard for the treatment of the detainees held in US custody, to 
counter the growing international criticism and concern about the recourse to torture and inhumane 
and  degrading  treatment  in  the  interrogation  techniques  employed  by the  US military  forces60. 
Among the provisions of the bill stood, however, also § 1005(e) that, in reply to Supreme Court’s 
decision in  Rasul, amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241 stripping federal court of the jurisdiction over the 
habeas corpus claims of the enemy combatants, by stating that “no court, justice or judge shall have 
jurisdiction to hear or consider – (1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf 
of an alien detained by the Department of Defence at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba”.
In the view of the political branches of government a new procedure had to be established to 
review  the  legality  of  the  aliens  held  as  enemy  combatants  in  Guantanamo,  without  all  the 
burdensome safeguards of a trial before a federal court. Indeed, following the ratio decidendi of the 
Supreme Court in Hamdi, the President created, with military order61, the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals  (CSRT).  Ad hoc Military Commissions  (MC) then were set  up, again with executive 
order62, to try and sentence the combatants for war crimes committed against the US. According to 
§§ 1005(e)(2)(3) of the DTA, the Court of Appeal for the District of Washington DC was entrusted 
only of the limited power to review whether the determinations of the CSRT and the MC were 
consistent with the standards and procedure specified in the military order establishing them.
Thus, when the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld made its way to the Supreme Court three compelling 
constitutional issue were at stake: 1) the application of the jurisdiction stripping provision of the § 
57 Rasul (Scalia J. dissenting) at 1
58 Hamdan (Opinion of the Court) at 11
59 Pub. L. 109-148
60 Seymour Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, The New Yorker, May 10, 2004; Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N. Y. LAW 
SCHOOL L. REV., (2004), 201-274; Philip Sand, (supra note 4), 205-222. For a restrictive interpretation of the prohibition 
of torture an inhumane and degrading treatments and for a justification of them in exceptional cases see the works of: 
Jonh Yoo e Julien Ho, The Status of terrorists, 136 UC BERKELEY SCHOOL OF LAW, PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY  
RESEARCH PAPER, (2004); Alain Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant, 48 48 N. Y. LAW SCHOOL L. REV., (2004), 275- 294
61 Order of the US Deputy Secretary of Defence, July 7, 2004, “Establishing Combattant Status Review Tribunal”, 
Defence Pentagon 20301-1010, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf
62 Order of the President of the United States, November 13, 2001, “Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism”, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833
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1005(e)  DTA; 2) the authority of the President  to  establish a MC to try enemy aliens for war 
crimes; 3) the legality of the procedure for the trials in front of the MC. The Supreme Court, this 
time, however, abandoned his previous self-restraint, especially toward the executive power, and 
took an intermediate step in the direction of the restoration the principle of the rule of law63. In fact, 
by interpreting narrowly the statutory provisions limiting its jurisdiction and adopting a “’process-
based institutional approach’ requiring coordination between Congress and the President”64 in the 
fight against terrorism, the Court was able to ensure a higher protection of due process rights. 
As far as the first issue was concerned, the majority of the Court (lead by Justice Stevens), 
rejected the argument advanced by the Administration arguing that § 1005(e) DTA deprived the 
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to hear the claim of Hamdan, an enemy combatant detained in 
Guantanamo. According to the Court, “ordinary principles of statutory construction suffice[d] to 
rebut  the  Government’s  theory”65.  The  DTA contained,  in  fact,  an  effective  date  provisions,  § 
1005(h) stating that §§ 1005(e)(2)(3) “shall apply with respect of any claim […] that is pending on 
or after the date of enactment of this Act” but saying nothing about the retroactive application of § 
1005(e)(1). It followed that if “Congress was reasonably concerned to ensure that §§ 1005(e)(2)(3) 
be applied to pending cases, it should have been just as concerned about § 1005(e)(1)”66.
The Court hence concluded that “Congress’ rejection of the very language that would have 
achieved  the  result  the  Government  urges  here  weighs  heavily  against  the  Government’s 
interpretation”67.  In  addition,  it  hold  that  “the  Government  has  identified  no  other  ‘important 
countervailing  interest’  that  would  permit  federal  courts  to  depart  from their  general  ‘duty  to 
exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred on them by Congress’”68. In their dissents, instead, both 
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas sharply criticized the majority decision, arguing that “the most 
natural reading”69 of the DTA excluded the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and that in any case 
“an exercise of sane equitable discretion”70 was here required to “respect the executive judgments in 
a matter of military operations and foreign affairs”71.
On the second issue, the petitioner was challenging the authority of the President to set up a 
MC to try him for committing a war crime, i.e. the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism against 
the US. The Supreme Court while recalling that, according to the US Uniform Code of Military 
63 Neal Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: the Legal Academies Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. (2006), 65
64 Rosenfeld (supra note 4), 2082
65 Hamdan (Opinion of the Court) at 11
66 Id. at 14
67 Id. at 14-15
68 Id. at 25
69 Hamdan (Scalia J. dissenting) at 1
70 Id.
71 Hamdan (Thomas J. dissenting) at 1
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Justice (UCMJ), MCs needed to be authorized “by statute or by the law of war”72, dismissed the 
argument of the executive claiming that an “overriding authorization”73 was granted by the AUMF 
or the DTA. Clearly showing the distance that separated its current approach from the deferential 
Hamdi jurisprudence  (where  the  AUMF  was  considered  as  a  sufficient  authorization  for  the 
President to detain citizens as enemy combatants), the Supreme Court ruled that  “neither of these 
congressional Acts, however, expand[ed] the President’s authority to convene MCs”74.
According to Justice Stevens, furthermore, the analysis of the law and practice of the ius in  
bello75 led to the conclusion that “none of the overt acts that Hamdan is alleged to have committed 
violates the law of war”76 with the consequence that also the second potential authorization for the 
establishment  of MCs is  missing,  because the crime of conspiracy to commit  terrorism “is  not 
triable by a law-of-war MC”77. Justice Kennedy however did not join in this part of the opinion of 
Justice Stevens, arguing that “in light of the conclusion that the MC here is unauthorized under the 
UCMJ, I see no need to consider several  further issues addressed in the plurality”78 concerning 
issues of international law: this specific part of the decision, therefore, may not be considered as 
part of the opinion of the Court.
On the last question, finally, the Supreme Court refused to remand the case to a lower court, 
arguing  that  Hamdan  “indeed  already  has  been excluded  from his  own trial”79,  and  thus  also 
addressed the issue of the legality of procedure set up by the executive to govern trials in front of 
the MCs, concluding that “the rules specified for Hamdan’s trial are illegal”80. As the Court pointed 
out,  to begin with,  the accused person was precluded from ever learning the evidence adduced 
against him that the judging officer of the MC deemed necessary to keep secret. In addition, the 
officer  could  admit  in  trial  any  evidence  (including  hearsay  and  evidences  obtained  through 
coercion), whenever he thought they had a probative value for a reasonable person and without the 
requirements of relevance and admissibility that apply even in courts-martial proceedings.
The procedure governing trials in front of the MC violated, in fact, the UCMJ: the UCMJ, 
while acknowledging, on one hand, that the rules governing the various type of military trials may 
differ  from the rules applicable in front of civil  courts,  if  the President deems it  impracticable, 
require, on the other hand, trials before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions, and 
72 Art. 21 UCMJ
73 Hamdan (Opinion of the Court) at 29
74 Id.
75 Fiona de Londras, The Right to Challenge the Lawfulness of Detention: an International Perspective on US Detention 
of Suspected Terrorists, 12 J. OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY L. (2007), 223-260
76 Hamdan (Opinion of the Court) at 36
77 Id.
78 Hamdan (Kennedy J. concurring in part) at 18
79 Hamdan (Opinion of the Court) at 53 (emphasis in the original)
80 Id. at 62
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other military tribunals to  be, among themselves “uniform insofar as practicable”81. According to 
the Court, however, the executive did not meet the burden imposed by the test and “nothing in the 
record before us demonstrate[d] that it would be impracticable to apply court-martial rules in this 
case”82.  It  hence  followed  that  “the  rules  applicable  in  courts-martial  must  apply”83 with  the 
consequence that the procedure of the MC were illegal.
“The procedures adopted to try Hamdan also violate[d] the Geneva Conventions”84, treaties 
duly ratified and therefore part of federal common law85. According to the Court, Common Art. 3 is 
relevant to the case: this provision in fact shall apply in “a conflict not of an international character” 
and a literal interpretation suggest that this means a conflict that “does not involve a clash between 
nations”86. Art. 3, in particular, sets a minimum standard of protection for the person placed hors de 
combat by prohibiting “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”. For the Court, “these  requirements are general 
ones […] But requirements they are nonetheless”87 and the MC did not meet them.
Hence, on the whole, Hamdan represents a step forward in the restoration of the rule of law. 
The wide margin of appreciation that was conceded to executive power in the first set of terrorist-
related decisions was significantly reduced and the protection of fundamental procedural rights, as a 
consequence, enhanced88. The Supreme Court exercised a strict review over the measures adopted 
by the President, reasserting that “the executive is bound to comply with the Rule of Law that 
prevails in this jurisdiction”89. On the other hand, though, the Court left untouched the room for 
manoeuvre of the legislature: as a matter of fact, rather than in the adoption of a “civil libertarian 
maximalism”90 approach that  safeguards  constitutional  rights  tout  court,  the true novelty of the 
decision laid in “the acknowledgment of a relevant role for the Congress in times of emergency”91.
4.  “The  laws  and  the  Constitution  are  designed  to  survive,  and  remain  in  force,  in 
extraordinary times”92: taking rights seriously
81 Art. 36(b) UCMJ
82 Hamdan (Opinion of the Court) at 60
83 Id. at 61
84 Id. at 62
85 6 U.S.T. 3314
86 Hamdan (Opinion of the Court) at 67
87 Id. at 72
88 Bologna (supra note 4), 817
89 Id.
90 Rosenfeld (supra note 4), 2082
91 Bologna, (supra note 4) 13-14
92 Boumediene (Opinion of the Court) at 70
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In October 2006, to answer to the objections of the Supreme Court in  Hamdan, Congress 
adopted  the Military Commission  Act (MCA)93.  The bill,  first  of  all,  granted the President  the 
explicit  authorization  to  convene  MCs  to  try  the  detainees  held  in  Guantanamo.  It  then  re-
established the inquisitorial provisions governing trials in front of the MCs. Finally, it striped again 
federal  courts  of  the  jurisdiction  to  hear  habeas  corpus claims  from the  enemy aliens  held  in 
custody of the US military. This time, however, §7 MCA made clear that the prohibition “to hear or 
consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the 
United States” was to “take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to all 
cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act”.
It was at this time evident, therefore, that “if this ongoing dialogue between and among the 
branches of government [had] to be respected, [the Supreme Court could] not ignore that the MCA 
was a direct response to Hamdan’s holding that the DTA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision had no 
application to pending cases”94. Hence, when the case Boumediene v. Bush reached the bench, the 
Supreme Court could nothing but affirm that “the MCA deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to 
entertain the habeas corpus action now before us”95. This nonetheless, ultimately, allowed the Court 
to  address  “a  question  not  resolved  by  our  earlier  cases  relating  to  the  detention  of  aliens  at 
Guantanamo: whether they have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, a privilege not to be 
withdrawn except in conformance with the Suspension Clause, Art. I, §9, cl. 2”96.
Seven  years  after  the  beginning  of  the  war  against  terror,  the  Supreme  Court  wore 
confidently  the  clothes  of  the  guardian  of  the  Constitution  and faced,  at  last,  the  fundamental 
question concerning the core right of enemy aliens, captured by the US military in the theatre of 
war,  designated  as  unlawful  combatants  and  deprived  of  liberty  without  due  process  of  law. 
Reasserting  its  institutional  position  and  eventually  taking  fundamental  rights  seriously,  the 
Supreme  Court  addressed,  in  fact,  “the  constitutional  issue  […that]  was  n[either]  reached  in 
Rasul”97, nor in Hamdan: do these enemy combatants have a constitutional privilege to contest the 
legality of their detention in front of an independent and regularly constituted tribunal? “We hold 
these petitioners do have the habeas corpus privilege”98.
Writing for a 5 to 4 majority, Justice Kennedy began the opinion of the Court providing an 
historical account of the writ of habeas corpus, from its development in the English common law as 
93 Pub. L. 109-366 (2006)
94 Boumediene (Opinion of the Court) at 8
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1
97 Id. at 3
98 Id. at 1
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a  tool  to  restrain  the  arbitrium of  the executive  power99 to  its  adoption  in  the American  legal 
system, where it “was one of the few safeguards of liberty specified in a Constitution that, at the 
outset, had no Bill of Rights”100. Abandoning with determination the self-restraint of its previous 
judgments in favour of a bold stand vis à vis the two political branches of government, moreover, 
the Court made clear that the purpose of the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus was to ensure 
“that, except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the 
writ, to maintain the ‘delicate balance of governance’ that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty”101.
The  Court,  then,  assessed  the  technical  issue  of  the  extra-territorial  application  of  the 
Suspension Clause of the Constitution in Guantanamo, discarding the formalistic approach lobbied 
by the Administration based on the idea that the Constitution applies only where the US exercise 
full sovereignty. On one hand, in fact, the Court highlighted “the obvious and uncontested fact that 
the United States, by virtue of its complete jurisdiction and control over the base, maintains de facto 
sovereignty  over”102 Guantanamo.  On  the  other  hand,  Justice  Kennedy  acknowledged  that  the 
precedents on the issue (together with Johnson103, also Reid v. Covert104, where actually the Court 
concluded  that  US citizens  tried  oversee  had  a  right  of  trial  by  jury)  conveyed  “the  idea  that 
questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concern, not formalism”105.
Hence, the Court adopted a functional approach106, arguing “that at least three factors are 
relevant in determining the reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the 
detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the 
nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles 
inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ”107. Now, given the peculiar features of 
the case, that involved “individuals detained by executive order for the duration of a conflict that, if 
measured from September 11, 2001, to the present, is already among the longest wars in American 
history”108 for the Court there were “few practical barriers to the running of the writ”109. Hence, the 
Court concluded “that Art.I, §9, cl.2, of the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay”110.
Even  if  Justice  Scalia  criticized  the  decision  as  a  ultra  vires “intervention  in  military 
matters”111, the Court drew from the recognizance that the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus 
99 CHARLES MCILLWAIN, COSTITUZIONALISMO ANTICO E MODERNO  162 (1990)
100 Boumediene (Opinion of the Court) at 8
101 Id. at 15
102 Id. at 25
103 See supra note 48
104 354 U.S. 1 (1957)
105 Boumediene (Opinion of the Court) at 34
106 Gerald Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution after Boumediene v. Bush, 39 HARV. PUB. L. WP (2008), 4
107 Boumediene (Opinion of the Court) at 36-37
108 Id. at 41
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Boumediene (Scalia J. dissenting) at 1
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applies in Guantanamo, the consequence that “if the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to 
the  detainees  now  before  us,  Congress  must  act  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  the 
Suspension Clause”112. The Court therefore also exercised judicial  review over §7 of the MCA, 
stripping federal courts of the jurisdiction to hear habeas claims from the enemy aliens held in the 
military base. Indeed, since “the MCA does not purport to be a formal suspension of the writ; and 
the Government […] has not argued that it is”113, either “Congress has provided adequate substitute 
procedure for habeas corpus”114 or the MCA is unconstitutional. 
The  alternative  procedure  to  review  the  legality  of  the  detention  of  enemy  combatants 
established by the political branches of government were two-stepped: to begin, the detainee faced a 
trial in front of the CSRT established by presidential order115; according to § 1005(e)(2) of the DTA, 
then, the Court of Appeal for the District of Washington DC could review the CSRT decision, but 
only on very limited procedural grounds. At both levels, however, the accused had severe limitation 
in the right to defend himself and rebut the reasons that legitimize its detention. The federal court, 
moreover, did not have “adequate authority to make a determination in light of the relevant law and 
facts  and to  formulate  and issue appropriate  orders  for  relief,  including,  if  necessary,  an  order 
directing the prisoner’s release”116.
In  the  end,  therefore,  the  Court  recognized  that  “the  easily  identified  attributes  of  any 
constitutionally adequate habeas corpus proceeding”117 were missing and ruled that the alternative 
review process set  up by the legislature  was,  “on its  face,  an inadequate  substitute  for  habeas 
corpus”118, with the consequence that “MCA §7 thus effects an unconstitutional suspension of the 
writ”119. Moreover, the Court held that habeas corpus proceedings could be brought directly before 
the federal courts, without awaiting for the determinations of the CSRT. Indeed, “in some of these 
cases  six  years  have  elapsed  without  the  judicial  oversight  that  habeas corpus or  an  adequate 
substitute demands. And there has been no showing that the Executive faces such onerous burdens 
that it cannot respond to habeas corpus actions”120.
The dissent of the Chief Justice well enlightened how the Court freed itself from its ‘original 
sin’:  John  G.  Roberts,  while  recognizing  that  the  Suspension  Clause  applied  in  Guantanamo, 
defended the substitute procedure for habeas corpus set up by the political branches of government 
112 Boumediene (Opinion of the Court) at 41
113 Id. at 42
114 Id.
115 See supra note 60
116 Boumediene (Opinion of the Court) at 58
117 Id. at 50
118 Id. at 64
119 Id.
120 Id. at 66
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as meeting “the minimal due process requirements outlined in  Hamdi”121, and urged the Court to 
show precisely the self-restraint initially adopted in terrorist-related cases, from which the majority, 
on the contrary, departed. Here the Court, in fact, stroke the balance between liberty and security in 
favour of fundamental due process rights, in the awareness that “security subsists, too, in fidelity to 
freedom’s first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and 
the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers”122.
In conclusion, the ruling in Boumediene represents the final step in the judicial efforts of the 
Supreme Court to restore the rule of law in the US constitutional  system. After having already 
demanded,  in  an  intermediate  phase,  that  the  acts  of  the  executive  power  complied  with  the 
Constitution, the Court now submitted also the activity of the legislative power to a strict, consistent 
review in order to ensure the respect of fundamental rights in countering the threat of terrorism123. 
Eventually, the Court confidently acknowledged its prominent institutional role, upheld to its full 
extent the supremacy of the Constitution with regard to all the political branches of government and 
“for  the  first  time  in  history,  […] found it  necessary  to  strike  down a  statute  as  violating  the 
Suspension Clause, rather than construe it to avoid invalidity”124.
Boumediene put an end to the legal black hole which had characterized the status of the 
detainees held in the military prison of Guantanamo. The Court took fundamental rights seriously 
and  reasserted  the  importance  of  the  constitutional  liberties,  especially  the  procedural remedy 
represented by the habeas corpus privilege, opening up a stream of litigation in front of the federal 
courts to review on the merit the legality of the detention of enemy combatants125. To put it simpler: 
it unequivocally clarified that “the laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in 
force, in extraordinary times. Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are 
reconciled within the framework of the law. The Framers decided that habeas corpus, a right of first 
importance, must be a part of that framework, a part of that law”126.
5. “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition”127: separation and balance of powers in 
the US Constitution
121 Boumediene (Roberts C.J. dissenting) at 5
122 Boumediene (Opinion of the Court) at 68-69
123 Martin Katz, Guantanamo, Boumediene and the Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Imperial President Meets the Imperial  
Courts, 25 UNIVERSITY OF DENVER LEGAL RESEARCH  WP (2008), 38
124 Neuman (supra note 103), 2-3
125 See supra note 1&2
126 Boumediene (Opinion of the Court) at 70
127 FEDERALIST PAPERS, LI (Madison), (supra note 9), 319
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The  analysis  of  the  case  law of  the  Supreme  Court  on  terrorism emphasizes  a  gradual 
jurisprudential  evolution,  from the earlier  decisions  (in  the aftermath  of  the  terrorist  attacks  of 
September 11, 2001), to the most recent judgment. Three different judicial phases, in particular, 
may be identified and distinguished, on the basis of the peculiar institutional position adopted by 
the  Supreme Court  and  the  degree  of  protection  of  fundamental  rights  that  was,  consequently, 
ensured. In the previous sections these phases were exemplified as follows: the 2004 rulings in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and  Rasul v. Bush were employed to describe the features of first phase; the 
2006 ruling in  Hamdan v. Rumsfled to illustrate that of the second one; and the late decision in 
Boumedine v. Bush in 2008 to address the third one.
In each phase the Supreme Court has acknowledged for itself a specific role and adopted a 
peculiar institutional position  vis à vis the other branches of government. In the initial phase, the 
Court pleaded deference toward the war making branches of government and left wide margin of 
manoeuvre to both the executive an the legislative powers. In the second, phase then, the Court 
abandoned its self-restraint toward the executive power, while recognizing the relevant discretion of 
Congress in times of emergency. In the third phase, eventually, the Court, showed full confidence 
about its institutional role in the US balance of governance, strictly reviewed the measure adopted 
by Congress too and quashed them, re-asserting that the legislative power, as well as the executive 
power, must comply with the rule of law.
Since, however, the safeguard of liberties follows from the allocation of powers among the 
different institutions, the evolving role of the judiciary has necessarily effected the protection of 
fundamental  rights:  chief  among  this,  the  right  of  habeas  corpus of  the  detainees  held  in 
Guantanamo, i.e. the privilege to have an independent judge review the reason for their detention. 
In the initial phase, the Court ensured only a limited protection of rights, by recognizing that due 
process may be tailored to alleviate excessive burden on the military.  In the intermediate phase, 
then, the Court raised the level of protection by narrowly interpreting congressional legislation and 
requiring  the  executive  to  respect  the  rule  of  law.  In  the  last  phase,  finally,  the  Court  took 
fundamental rights seriously, upholding the habeas corpus provision enshrined in the Constitution.
From this point of view, the analysis of the case law of the Supreme Court on terrorism give 
us the opportunity to reflect, one more time, on the effectiveness of the US constitutional model128, 
128 On the US constitutional model see in general: LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988) (GERALD  
GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1997); BARBARA BARDES, MAC SHELLEY & STEFFEN SCHMIDT, AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS TODAY (2005); AUGUSTO BARBERA & CARLO FUSARO, IL GOVERNO DELLE DEMOCRAZIE (2001); RALPH 
ROSSUM & ALAN TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: (VOLUME 1) THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT. For an historical 
perspective on the US system of governance see: GIOVANNI BOGNETTI, LO SPIRITO DEL COSTITUZIONALISMO AMERICANO (2000);  
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA (2004); AKIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION (2005); BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE 
FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (2005); LUCA STROPPIANA, STATI UNITI (2006). On the President see, among many: 
ROBERTO TONIATTI, COSTITUZIONE E DIREZIONE DELLA POLITICA ESTERA NEGLI STATI UNITI D’AMERICA (1983); ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, 
THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1989); Silverstein (supra note 15). On the Congress see, among many: STEVEN SMITH, JASON 
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founded  on  the  Madisonian  intuition  that  the  check  and  balance  among  powers  is  “in  a  way 
essential  […] if one wants to protect  the liberty of citizens against an arbitrary government”129. 
Since power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely, to guarantee a better protection of the 
natural inalienable rights of the individual “ambition must be made to counteract ambition”130. The 
US Constitution adopted in Philadelphia in 1789, therefore, rejected the system of fusion of powers 
prevailing  in  the European parliamentary models  of  the  18th century and established  a  form of 
government where separated institutions control and balance each other, while sharing power131.
In the US system of separation of powers, hence, the judiciary plays a far more important 
role than the one described by Hamilton (perhaps to minimize the anti-majoritarian elements of the 
US Constitution) according to which: “The judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three 
departments  of  power;  it  can never  attack  with success  the  other  two;  and all  possible  care  is 
requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks”132. Even though the Supreme Court has 
neither the power of the purse (which belongs to Congress on the basis of Art.I of the Constitution), 
nor the power of the sword (a prerogative of the President under Art.II  of the Constitution),  it 
benefits of the institutional prerogative recognized by Art.III133, and additionally of the power to 
review the constitutionality of the decisions of the political branches of government.
For sure, the counter-majoritarian difficulty generated by judicial review is a  τοpiος in the 
law & political science literature about the Supreme Court134. Even though the Supremacy Clause, 
Art.VI, §1, cl.2, states that the “Constitution […] shall be the Supreme Law of the land”, no express 
reference to judicial review may be found in the constitutional text, and it was only in the landmark 
ROBERT & RYAN VANDER WIELEN, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS (2005). On the Supreme Court see: ROBERT MCCLOSKEY & 
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also, ANGIOLETTA SPERTI, CORTI SUPREME E CONFLITTI TRA POTERI: SPUNTI PER UN CONFRONTO ITALIA-USA SUGLI STRUMENTI E LE  
TECNICHE DI GIUDIZIO DEL GIUDICE COSTITUZIONALE (2005)
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Marbury v. Madison135 decision that the Court recognized it. On the other hand, however, the idea 
of judicial review is implicit in the structure of the US Constitution136, since “certainly all those who 
have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law 
of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the 
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void”137. 
Hamilton himself, after all, wrote that “a Constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by 
the judges as, a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the 
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an 
irreconcilable variance between two, that which has a superior obligation and validity ought, of 
course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute 
[…]”138. It is, in fact, the distinction between the constituent and the constituted power, between 
“the intention of the people and the intention of their agents”139, that demands the annulment, by the 
judiciary,  of  the  executive  and  legislative  acts  that  violate  the  division  of  competence  or  the 
substantive limits established by the Constitution and its Bill of Rights.
The  analysis  of  the  case  law of  the  Supreme Court  on  terrorism also  brings  light  over 
another peculiar feature of the compound US system of governance. The judiciary, in fact, does not 
operate  in  a  vacuum:  it  faces  reality  and is  affected  by the  pressure  of  the  other  branches  of 
government140. In times of terrorist emergencies, the Supreme Court may thus be compelled to make 
short  term concessions  to  the  executive  and  the  legislature,  reducing  its  review to  a  minimal, 
unsatisfactory, scrutiny. Nevertheless, in the long run, as the conditions justifying the état de siège 
fade away, the Supreme Court is the first institution to realign with the constitutional principles, 
fully reviewing the legality of the measures adopted by the political  branches of government in 
order to ensure that the State remains “a government of laws and not of men”141.  
When,  in  times  of  emergency,  the  Court  strikes  down legislation  enacted  by  popularly 
elected  bodies,  the  counter-majoritarian  difficulty  reaches  its  zenith.  As,  however,  Advocate 
General Poiares Maduro of the European Court of Justice has, mutatis mutandis, stated: “especially 
in  matters  of  public  security,  the  political  process  is  liable  to  become  overly  responsive  to 
immediate popular concerns, leading the authorities to allay the anxieties of the many at the expense 
of the rights of a few. This is precisely when courts ought to get involved, in order to ensure that the 
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Antonio Reposo eds., 1985), 43
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political necessities of today do not become the legal realities of tomorrow. Their responsibility is to 
guarantee that what may be politically expedient at a particular moment also complies with the rule 
of law without which, in the long run, no democratic society can truly prosper”142.
In general, for that reason, the trend in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court analyzed in 
this paper, confirms that the US constitutional architecture altogether stood the challenges posed by 
terrorism and by the reactions to it. Despite a weak departure, the Supreme Court has been able, 
step by step, to defend the US delicate balance of governance and to ensure an effective protection 
of fundamental  due process rights.  In the long run,  just  as the European judiciary,  the US one 
“experimented its capacity of being rigorous in the protection of rights in one of the most thorny 
fields,  given  the  fact  that  the  seriousness  of  the  international  situation  tends  to  attenuate  the 
sensitiveness toward the rights of the suspected terrorist and produces a stronger propensity toward 
the demand of security rather than towards the demand of liberty and justice”143.
The French Declaration of Rights of Men and Citizen denied the existence of a Constitution 
in those societies “where the fundamental rights are not protected and the separation of powers not 
guaranteed”144:  the  US  Constitution  meets  both  requirements  because  its  judges  (especially  the 
Supreme Court judges) operate as guardians of both its institutional structure (the Framework of 
government)  and of its  substantive principle  (the Bill  of Rights).  Notwithstanding the vehement 
Commander in Chief rhetoric of the White House, or the budget-based arguments of the Capitol, it is 
the Supreme Court the institutions that hold the last word, the real strongest branch of government. 
Because, as the Chief Justice Charles H. Hughes already in 1907 could realistically say: “We are 
under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is”145.  
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to address the question whether the US Supreme Court has 
taken fundamental rights (and especially  habeas corpus) seriously while reviewing the legality of 
the measures adopted by the political branches of government to counter the terrorist threat. Since 
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court  has gradually evolved,  I  have argued that  an adequate 
answer to the question requires a distinguishing between three different judicial phases. In its first 
decisions,  the  Court  adopted  a  minimalist  approach,  affording  only  a  limited  protection  of 
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fundamental rights. In a second step, then, the Court heightened rights protection at an intermediate 
level by narrowly interpreting congressional legislation and requiring the executive to respect the 
rule of law. Eventually, in the last phase, the Court undertook a strict scrutiny of the acts of the 
legislature ensuring full respect of the human rights standard enshrined in the US Constitution.
In  particular,  by  recognizing  in  Boumediene the  applicability  of  the  “fundamental 
procedural protection”146 represented by the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, the Supreme 
Court has opened the route for enemy combatants, held in the military prison of Guantanamo, to 
challenge their detention before regular US federal courts. As the recent holdings by Justices Urbina 
and Leon in Washington DC underline, federal judges will now have to rule on the merit whether 
the Administration legally detains the enemy combatants147. In his decision, indeed, Justice Urbina, 
while ordering the executive to release five prisoners, confirmed the detention of a sixth combatant 
(an Algerian for which grounded evidences existed that linked him to terrorism), confirming that 
the  ratio of  Boumediene is not to cause a generalized amnesty, but just to reaffirm the need of a 
procedural tool to review the reasons that justify the limitation of liberty.
The Supreme Court itself will soon provide further clues with regard to the protection of 
fundamental rights: having accepted on December 5, 2008 the writ of certiorari in the case Al Marri  
v. Pucciarelli148,  the Court will have to decide (perhaps in March) whether the AUMF authorize 
and, if so, whether the Constitution allow, the seizure and indefinite military detention of a person 
lawfully  residing  in  the  United  States,  without  criminal  charge  or  trial,  based  on  government 
assertions that the detainee conspired with al Qaeda to engage in terrorist activities149. The case will 
moreover give the opportunity to understand what position the new Obama Administration will take 
on the appropriate mean to fight the war against terror, either supporting or disavowing one of the 
most aggressive legal claims made by the previous Administration: that the President may order the 
seizure of a legal resident and hold him indefinitely without charge150.
The solution to the case is anything but certain. The analysis of the case law of the Supreme 
Court - from the initial self-restraint of Hamdi and Rasul, through the intermediate step of Hamdan 
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till the final confidence of Boumediene - showed a growing importance of the fundamental rights 
discourse  in  reviewing  the  legality  of  the  counter-terrorism  measures  adopted  by  the  political 
branches  of  government.  Nonetheless,  as  wisely  prof.  Neuman  underlined,  “precedents  can  be 
interpreted broadly, interpreted narrowly and overruled”151. The threat of terrorism is not dawning, 
as daily news constantly remember us. The hope is, however, that the new political mood that just 
emerged in the US will favour a constitutionally adequate response to the new terrorist emergencies 
and that the Supreme Court will continue answering with a clear voice to the (not always rhetorical) 
question asked in the title of this paper: taking fundamental rights seriously? Yes, please.
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